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INTRODUCTION: PRAISING WITH 
FAINT DAMNATION-THE TROUBLING 
REHABILITATION OF KOREMATSU 
ALFRED C. YEN* 
It is my great pleasure to introduce this joint symposium issue of 
the Boston College Law Review and the Boston College Third World Law 
Journal. The articles printed here represent part of a spectacular day-
long program entitled The Long Shadow of Kore11latsu which took place 
at Boston College Law School on October 3, 1998, during the fifth 
annual Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty. Thanks are 
owed to all those at Boston College Law School who supported the 
conference and symposium, particularly Dean James Rogers. Special 
thanks must also be given to Aviam Soifer, who generously backed the 
first Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty when it was just 
an idea, and graced the fifth Conference as a speaker. 
In 1942, the United States interned 110,000 Japanese Americans. l 
These people were forced to leave their homes, businesses, jobs and 
communities despite never being formally charged with any civil or 
criminal offense. The government's justification for this was simple 
and chilling: the ancestry of Japanese Americans made them likely to 
side with Japan during World War II. To their credit, some Japanese 
Americans challenged internment in the courts. Their efforts failed, 
however, when the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of internment in the case of Kore11latsu v. United States. 2 
History has properly judged the Kore1llatsu case harshly because it 
memorializes the Supreme Court's complicity in this gross violation of 
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The author would like to thank K("ith Aoki 
for his assistance in organizing th(" Conference of Asian Pacific American La,,' Faculty, and Sumi 
Cho and Dean Hashimoto for their efforts and assistance in putting th(" symposium on Kor("matsu 
together. Frank \'\'u deserves credit for bringing the ("ssay discussed her("in to th(" author's 
attention, and Karin Yen, Sharon Beckman and Ilana Hurwitz provided \'aluable comments, 
1 SUCHENG CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS, AN INTERPRETI\'E HISTORY 122 (1991), The use of the 
term 'Japanese Americans" is meant to includ(" both American citizens of Japanese d("sc("nt and 
resid("nt aliens of Japanese desc("nt. I include tI](" r("sicknt aliens ,dthin th(" term 'Japanese 
Americans" because many resident aliens of Japan("se desc("nt "'Oltld have b("cOllle naturalized 
American citizens but for the explicit legal prohibition against their doing so. See infra note 20 
and accompanying text. 
2 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Hirabayashi y. Lnit("d Stat("s, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding 
application of curfew order against Japanese Americans), 
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consitutional and human rights. The subsequent clearing of Fred Kore-
matsu's criminal record3 and the payment of reparations to the victims 
of internment4 stand as evidence that the U.S. government acknow-
ledges the terrible injustice it inflicted on Japanese Americans. This 
suggests that Korematsu has been permanently discredited; a mistake 
never to be repeated. 
Unfortunately, proclamations of Korematsu 's permanent discredit-
ing are premature. The Supreme Court has never overruled the case. 
It stallds as valid precedent, an authoritative interpretation of our 
Constitution and the "supreme Law of the Land."5 While modern 
courts continue to cite Korematsu, critical references to it are noticeably 
rare.!) Moreover, it is easy to confuse the healing of wounds brought 
on by the passage of time with acceptance of what happened more 
than fifty years ago. If our society forgets internment's misery and 
injustice, the Korematsu case may come to be viewed as one of those 
unfortunate, but necessary, compromises that "wasn't all that bad." 
Even if those who openly support the internment remain few in num-
ber,7 those who (to turn a familiar phrase upside down) "praise it with 
faint damnation" are likely to increase, thereby making it respectable 
to overlook, or even deny, the racism that made internment possible. 
This only heightens the chance that our country will someday intern 
innocent civilians once again.8 
A prime example of the way in which Korematsu may be "praised 
with faint damnation" is a recent essay by no less than the Chief Justice 
of the United States Supreme Court; William H. Rehnquist. In When 
the Laws were Silent,9 the Chief Justice considers the internment and 
3 Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 140 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("Korematsu Coram Nobis"); 
see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming vacation of Hira-
bayashi's conviction for violating curfew). 
4 See 50 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (Civil Liberties Act of 1988, authorizing payment of reparations 
to Japanese Americans); CHAN, supra note 1, at 173-74 (recounting history of reparations 
legislation) . 
5 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1 (referring to the Constitution as the "supreme Law of the Land"). 
6 A Key Cite (Westlaw) search l'eveals 1964 documents citing the Korematsu opinion. Of these 
citations, only 2 is identified as critical or negative history. Similarly, a Shepard's search on Westlaw 
reveals 534 judicial citations to Korematsu. Of these cites, only 2 are marked as "questioned." 
Finally, aLexis Auto-cite seal"Ch idenitifies only one case that "criticizes" Korematsu. 
7 For a discussion of those who still openly support the internment, see Robert Ito, Concen-
tration Camp or Summer Camp?, MOTHER JONES, Sept. 15, 1998, available at <http://bsd.mo-
jones. com/ news_ wire/ ito.html>. 
8 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, j., dissenting) (referring to Korematsu as a "loaded 
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent 
need. E,-ery repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands 
it to new purposes."). 
9 William H. Rehnquist, When the Laws Were Silent, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1998, at 77-89. This 
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the criticisms advanced against the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice 
never endorses the internment, nor does he claim that the Korematsu 
decision was unproblematic. At the same time, however, the Chief 
Justice is curiously muted in his criticism of the internment and those 
responsible for it. 
Consider the Chief Justice's description of the internment: 
First a curfew was imposed on the ethnic Japanese, then they 
were required to report to relocation centers, and finally they 
were taken to camps in the interior of California and in the 
mountain states. There was no physical brutality, but there 
were certainly severe hardships: removal from the place 
where one lived, often the forced sale of houses and busi-
nesses, and harsh living conditions in the spartan quarters of 
the internment centers. 1O 
This description of internment contains no glaring inaccuracies, 
yet its language suggests detached indifference. The Chief Justice notes 
that "there was no physical brutality," but internment is, by definition, 
brutal. Moreover, the word "physical" elides internment's psychological 
brutality. According to the Chief Justice, removal from one's home, the 
forced sale of property (often at prices so low as to be essentially 
confiscatory), and harsh living quarters are only "severe hardships," 
and not "brutality." 
Admittedly, taken alone, this passage may not desene the inter-
pretation suggested here. Perhaps I ha\'e unnecessarily quibbled over 
the connotations of words like "brutality" and "hardship." The rest of 
Rehnquist's essay, however, creates even more discomfort because he 
studiously avoids criticizing every arm of the government responsible 
for internment. 
The Chief Justice defends the military for exaggerating the alleged 
threat posed by Japanese Americans: 
In defense of the military it should be pointed out that these 
officials were not entrusted with the protection of anyone's 
civil liberty; their job was making sure that vital areas were as 
secure as possible from espionage or sabotage. The role of 
General DeWitt was not one to encourage a nice calculation 
essay appears in similar form as part of the ChiefJlIstice's book. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL 
THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 184-211 (1998). 
10 [d. at 78. 
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of the costs in civil liberty as opposed to the benefits to 
national security. I I 
The Chief Justice is similarly kind to Henry Stimson and John 
McCloy, the civilians charged with military oversight as Secretary 
and Assistant Secretary of War respectively. His assertion that these 
men felt no need to defend civil liberties seems odd given the fact 
that Stimson and McCloy took oaths "to support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States."12 
The Chief Justice then completely omits the Justice Department's 
complicated role in the internment, especially the behavior of the 
Solicitor General's office. This lapse is particularly unfortunate given 
the Chief Justice's defense of the military. Even if the entire Depart-
ment of War correctly felt no obligation to guard the consitutional 
rights of Japanese Americans, this claim cannot, by mere extension, 
apply to the Justice Department, whose function was the enforcement 
of the constitutional rights violated by internment. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the case for internment stood on 
distortions about the threat posed by Japanese Americans, Justice De-
partment lawyers-including the Solicitor General's office-owed an 
ethical obligation to correct those falsehoods before the Supreme 
Court.iJ It is abundantly clear that the Solcitor General knew that the 
government's argument to the Supreme Court depended on such 
misrepresentations. Justice Department lawyer Edward Ennis drew the 
Solicitor General's attention to these misrepresentations, argued for 
rectification of the factual record, and was overruled. 14 It is therefore 
not possible to defend the Justice Department by simply asserting that 
the Department (like the military) was simply "doing its job." The 
Chief Justice'S failure to discuss the Justice Department is significant 
because it creates the impression that nobody in the executive branch 
of government had responsibility for protecting the constitutional 
11 !d. at 86. 
12 See 5 U .S.C. § 3331 (1994) (proyiding that all those appointed to civil service shall take an 
oath promising "to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, 
foreign and domestic"); see also United States ex rei. Reel v. Badt, 152 F.2d 627, 630 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(mentioning oath taken under then 5 U.S.C.A. § 16, from which the present provision is derived, 
that included the phrase "to support and defend the Constitution of the United States"). 
13 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4), (5), (6) (1998) 
(prohibiting use of false evidence); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1998) 
(requiring candor toward a tribunal). 
H See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 195-206 (1983); see also Korematsu Comm Noms, 584 F. 
Supp. 1417-19 (describing how the United States Justice Department knowingly withheld critical 
information from the Supreme Court); CHAN, supra note I, at 138. 
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rights of Japanese Americans. By extension, it insinuates that the ex-
ecutive branch of our government, from the military to the Solicitor 
General, behaved correctly by carrying out and defending the intern-
ment of Japanese Americans. 
The Chief Justice's analysis leaves the Supreme Court as the only 
organ of government that might be charged with responsibility for 
stopping the il1iustice of internment. Here too, the Chief Justice takes 
great pains to justifY the Court's actions. Indeed, he is far easier on the 
Court than the Justices who dissented in Korematsu. The result is an 
analysis that is both fascinating and troubling. 
The Chief Justice starts with a conventional defense of judicial 
deference to military decision in time ofwar.15 Concluding that judicial 
deference does not bestow unbridled freedom upon the military, the 
Chief Justice considers the argument that internment and the Kore-
matsu decision were wrong because they were based on racial distinc-
tions. It is here that the Chief Justice'S reluctance to criticize becomes 
most clear. At the outset, he rejects the charge that racism caused 
internment or the Korematsu decision. He writes: 
The Court's answer to this attack seems satisfactory: Those Of 
Japanese descent were displaced because of fear that disloyal 
elements among them would aid Japan in the war. Though 
there were undoubtedly nativists in California who welcomed 
a chance to see the issei and nisei removed, it does not follow 
that this point of view was attributable to the military deci-
sionmakers. They, after all, did not at first propose reloca-
tion. 16 
The inadequacy of this analysis is painful. The Chief Justice believes 
that Japanese Americans were interned because of fear that some 
Japanese Americans were disloyal, and not on account of racism. 
But why would anyone believe Japanese Americans to be disloyal? 
The obvious answer is "because they're Japanese." The Chief Justice 
therefore skirts perilously close to endorsing the argument that 
biological ancestry is rational evidence of political loyalty. He stops 
short of this endorsement, if at all, only by suggesting that the 
federal government could treat aliens of Japanese descent differ-
ently from citizens of Japanese descent. Even here, though, the 
Chief Justice seems curiously untroubled by either internment or 
the Korematsu majority. 
I,) See Rehnqllist) supra note 9, at 87-88. 
lfi [d. at 88. 
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For example, the Chief Justice answers his own question about the 
constitutionality of interning Japanese-American citizens with the state-
ment "[u]nder today's constitutional law, certainly not."17 The use of 
"today's" suggests that the internment of U.S. citizens was constitu-
tional when it occurred, and the Chief Justice never clears up this 
disturbing possibility. Among other things, he states that the fear of 
disloyal Japanese-American citizens "was not wholly groundless."l8 He 
then writes, "But although such information might well have justified 
exclusion of Qapanese-American citizens] ... from work in aircraft 
factories without strict security clearance, it falls considerably short of 
justifying the dislodging of thousands of citizens from their homes on 
the basis of ancestry."l!! Notice the change in grammatical tense be-
tween the words '~ustified" and "falls." By using the past tense in talking 
about the possible justification for treating Japanese-American citizens 
differently from other citizens, the Chief Justice clearly makes a state-
ment about legal outcomes decided in the past. However, by using the 
present tense when discussing the lack of justification, he leaves open 
the possibility that he is still referring to "today's constitutional law," 
and not yesterday's. 
The Chief Justice's analysis about the internment of aliens of 
Japanese descent does not fare much better. He justifies their intern-
ment2U by referring to the Alien Enemies Law of 1798, which provided 
that the United States could arrest the unnaturalized citizens of coun-
tries with whom the United States was at war.21 Leaving aside for the 
moment whether the Alien Enemies Law was itself constitutional or 
just, the Chief Justice'S argument rests problematically on an overly 
blunt distinction between aliens and citizens. Many interned aliens of 
Japanese descent were not American citizens only because naturaliza-
tion was legally restricted "to aliens being free white persons and to 
aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent."22 The very 
racism discredited by the Chief Justice actually lies at the core of the 
alien status that the Chief Justice relies upon in defending the intern-
ment of aliens of Japanese descent. Nevertheless, he seems untroubled 
17/d. at 88 (emphasis added). 
1~ Id. 
19Id. (emphasis added). 
20 See Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 89. 
21 See id. 
22 Charles J. McClain, Tortuo1ls Path, Elusive Goal: The Asian Quest for American Citizenship, 
2 ASIAN LJ. 33, 35 (1995) (quoting section 2169, Revised Statutes of 1875). This provision 
remained unchanged until after the internment. Id. 
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by the idea that racism creates legal distinctions that justify disparate 
legal treatment on the basis of race during time of war: 
There is considerable irony, of course, in relying on pre-
viously existing laws discriminating against Japanese immi-
grants to conclude that still further disabilities should be 
imposed upon them because they had not been assimilated 
into the Caucasian majority. But in time of war a nation may 
be required to respond to a condition without making a 
careful inquiry into how that condition came about.23 
The Chief Justice concludes his essay by calling Kore11latsu "the 
least justified"-as opposed to urtiustified-curtailment of cidl liberty 
during wartime. His words show why it is important for scholars to 
study carefully Kore11latsu and its legal legacy. As noted earlier, the 
passage of time and healing of wounds make it easy to forget the 
injustice of internment. If "it wasn't that bad," the climate becomes 
ripe for rewriting the history that so rightly condemns internment. 
Perhaps the Chief Justice did not intend to rehabilitate Kore11latsu. 
Nevertheless, his reluctance to clearly criticize the internment and 
those responsible for it makes rehabilitation more likely. 
Fortunately, the articles published here provide a powerful coun-
terweight to essays like the Chief Justice's. By speaking out and pub-
lishing, the symposium participants nourish the vitally important pro-
ject of making sure that our country remembers its history, and does 
not repeat it. As long as these words remain, those who try to defend 
Kore11latsu must confront scholarly research that casts doubt on their 
efforts. We must remember what happened over fifty years ago. We 
must remember that it was terrible, unjustified, and wrong. 
23 See Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 88. 

